Oblivious transfer is the cryptographic primitive where Alice sends one of two bits to Bob but is oblivious to the bit received. Using quantum communication, we can build oblivious transfer protocols with security provably better than any protocol built using classical communication. However, with imperfect apparatus one needs to consider other attacks. In this paper we present an oblivious transfer protocol which is impervious to lost messages.
Definition 1.2 (Strong coin-flipping (SCF)).
A strong coin-flipping protocol, denoted SCF, with cheating probabilities (A SCF , B SCF ) and bias ε SCF is a protocol with no inputs and output c ∈ { 0, 1, abort } satisfying:
• if Alice and Bob are honest, then they never abort and they output the same randomly generated bit c ∈ {0, 1};
• A SCF is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can force honest Bob to accept some outcome c = a, over both choices of a ∈ {0, 1};
• B SCF is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can force honest Alice to accept some outcome c = b, over both choices of b ∈ {0, 1};
• ε SCF := max{A SCF , B SCF } − 1/2.
We note here that SCF protocols can be used as WCF protocols. The only issue is if the outcome is "abort". In this case, the party who detected the cheating announces themselves the winner. Doing this, the bias in the WCF protocol is the same as in the SCF protocol.
Aharonov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani, and Yao [ATVY00] first showed the existence of an SCF protocol with bias ε SCF < 1/2 followed shortly by Ambainis [Amb01] who showed an SCF protocol with bias ε SCF = 1/4. As for lower bounds, Mayers [May97] , Lo, and Chau [LC97] showed that bias ε SCF = 0 is impossible. Kitaev [Kit03] , and later Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] , extended this result to show that the bias of any SCF protocol satisfies ε SCF ≥ 1/ √ 2 − 1/2. This bound was proven to be tight by Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK09] who showed the existence of protocols with bias ε SCF < 1/ √ 2 − 1/2 + δ for any δ > 0. As for WCF protocols, it was shown that the bias could be less than Kitaev's bound. For example, the protocols in [SR02, KN04, Moc05] provide biases of ε WCF = 1/ √ 2 − 1/2, ε WCF = 0.239, and ε WCF = 1/6, respectively. The best known lower bound for WCF is by Ambainis [Amb01] who showed that a protocol with bias ε WCF must use Ω(log log(1/ε WCF )) rounds of communication. Then, in a breakthrough result, Mochon [Moc07] showed the existence of WCF protocols with bias ε WCF < δ for any δ > 0.
Oblivious transfer is the cryptographic primitive where Alice sends to Bob one of two bits but is oblivious to the bit received. We define oblivious transfer and its notions of cheating below.
Definition 1.3 (Oblivious transfer (OT)
). An oblivious transfer protocol, denoted OT, with cheating probabilities (A OT , B OT ) and bias ε OT is a protocol with inputs satisfying:
• Alice inputs two bits (x 0 , x 1 ) and Bob inputs an index b ∈ {0, 1};
• when Alice and Bob are honest they never abort, Bob learns x b perfectly, Bob gets no information about x¯b, and Alice gets no information about b;
• A OT is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can learn b without Bob aborting the protocol;
• B OT is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can learn x 0 ⊕ x 1 without Alice aborting the protocol;
When a party cheats, we only refer to the probability which they can learn the desired values without the other party aborting. For example, when Bob cheats, we do not require that he learns either bit with probability 1.
In the OT definition above there can be different ways to interpret the bias. For example, we could consider worst-case choices over inputs, we could assume the inputs are chosen randomly, etc. The protocol construction given in this paper is independent of how the inputs are chosen so this is not an issue.
Like weak coin-flipping, oblivious transfer has a related primitive which is useful for the analysis in this paper. Definition 1.4 (Randomized oblivious transfer (Random-OT)). A randomized oblivious transfer protocol, denoted Random-OT, with cheating probabilities (A ROT , B ROT ) and bias ε ROT is a protocol with no inputs satisfying:
• Alice outputs two randomly generated bits (x 0 , x 1 ) and Bob outputs two bits ( 
is independently, randomly generated;
• when Alice and Bob are honest they never abort, Bob gets no information about x¯b, and Alice gets no information about b;
• A ROT is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can learn b without Bob aborting the protocol;
• B ROT is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can learn x 0 ⊕ x 1 without Alice aborting the protocol;
We note here that a protocol is considered fair if the cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob are equal and unfair otherwise.
OT is an interesting primitive since it can be used to construct secure two-party protocols [EGL82] , [Cré87] , [Rab81] . It was shown by Lo [Lo97] that ε OT = 0 is impossible. This result was improved by Chailloux, Kerenidis, and Sikora [CKS10] who showed that every OT protocol satisfies ε OT ≥ 0.0586.
Various settings for oblivious transfer have been studied before such as the bounded-storage model [DFSS08] and the noisy-storage model [Sch10] . In this paper, we study only information theoretic security but we allow the possibility of lost messages (more on this below). Oblivious transfer has a rich history, has various definitions, and has many names such as the set membership problem [JRS02] or private database querying [JSG + 10].
A loss-tolerant protocol is a quantum cryptographic protocol which is impervious to lost messages. That is, neither Alice nor Bob can cheat more by declaring that a message was lost (even if it was received) or by sending blank messages deliberately. We prefix a protocol with "LT-" to indicate that it is loss-tolerant.
The idea of loss-tolerance was first applied to strong coin-flipping by Berlin, Brassard, Bussieres, and Godbout in [BBBG08] . They showed a vulnerability in the best known coin-flipping protocol construction by Ambainis [Amb01] . They circumvented this problem and presented an LT-SCF protocol with bias ε SCF = 0.4. Aharon, Massar, and Silman generalized this protocol to a family of LT-SCF protocols with bias slightly smaller at the cost of using more qubits in the communication [AMS10] . Chailloux added an encryption step to the protocol in [BBBG08] to improve the bias to ε SCF = 0.359 [Cha10] . The best known protocol for LT-SCF is by Ma, Guo, Yang, Li, and Wen [MGY + 11] who use an EPR-based protocol which attains a bias of ε SCF = 0.3536. It remains an open problem to find the best possible biases for LT-WCF and LT-SCF. In fact, we do not even know if there is an LT-WCF protocol with bias less than the best possible bias for LT-SCF; they may in fact share the same smallest possible bias.
The first approach to designing loss-tolerant oblivious transfer protocols was by Jakobi, Simon, Gisin, Bancal, Branciard, Walenta, and Zbinden [JSG + 10]. They designed a loss-tolerant protocol for private database querying which is also known as "1-out-of-N oblivious transfer." The protocol is not technically an oblivious transfer protocol (using the definition in this paper) since an honest Bob may receive too much information. However, it is practical in the sense that it is secure against the most evident attacks. The backbone of their protocol is the use of a quantum key distribution scheme. This differs from the loss-tolerant protocol in this paper which is based on weak coin-flipping.
The results of this paper
We first present a protocol in Section 2 and prove it is not loss-tolerant. Then, in Section 3, we show how to build LT-OT protocols from LT-WCF and LT-Random-OT protocols. Namely, we prove the following theorem. 
This protocol has bias
We have ε OT < ε ROT when ε WCF < 1/2 and A ROT = B ROT . Furthermore, the OT protocol is fair when the LT-WCF protocol is fair.
In Subsection 3.4, we show the existence of an unfair LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A ROT , B ROT ) = (1, 1/2). Combining this with the fact that there is a fair LT-WCF protocol with bias ε WCF = 0.3536 [MGY + 11] we get the following corollary. Corollary 1.6. There exists a fair LT-OT protocol with bias ε OT = 0.4268.
An example of a Random-OT protocol that is not loss-tolerant
In this section, we examine a protocol for Random-OT and show it is not loss-tolerant. This protocol has the same vulnerability as the best known coin-flipping protocol constructions based on bit-commitment, see [BBBG08] for details.
Protocol 2.1 (A Random-OT protocol [CKS10])).
(i) Bob randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and sends Alice half of the two-qutrit state
(ii) Alice randomly chooses x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} and applies the following unitary to the qutrit
(iii) Alice returns the qutrit to Bob. Bob now has the two-qutrit state It has been shown in [CKS10] that Bob can learn x 0 ⊕ x 1 with probability 1 and Alice can learn b with maximum probability 3/4. However, this does not take into account "lost-message strategies." We now show such a strategy and how Alice can learn b perfectly. Suppose Alice measures the first message in the computational basis. If she sees outcome "0" or "1" then she knows Bob's index b with certainty. If the outcome is "2" then she replies to Bob, "Sorry, your message was lost." Then they restart the protocol and Alice can measure again. Eventually, Alice will learn b perfectly proving this protocol is not loss-tolerant.
This protocol illustrates another interesting point about the design of OT protocols. One may not be able to simply change the amplitudes in the starting states to balance the cheating probabilities. For example, if we were to change the amplitudes in |φ b , then Bob would have a nonzero probability of getting the wrong value for x b . Thus, balancing an unfair OT protocol is not as straightforward as it can be in coin-flipping.
Constructing loss-tolerant oblivious transfer protocols
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.5 by constructing an LT-OT protocol from an LT-WCF protocol and a (possibly unfair) LT-Random-OT protocol. In doing so, we have to overcome some issues that are not present when designing LT-SCF protocols. These issues include:
• it is not always possible to simply reset a protocol with inputs;
• balancing the cheating probabilities can be difficult;
• it is not possible to switch the roles of Alice and Bob since Bob must be the receiver;
• an honest party must not learn extra information about the other party's inputs (or outputs in the case of Random-OT).
We deal with these issues by reducing the problem one step at a time. First we reduce the task of finding LT-OT protocols to finding LT-Random-OT protocols in Subsection 3.1. Then we build an LT-Random-OT protocol from an LT-WCF protocol and two (possibly unfair) LT-Random-OT protocols in Subsection 3.2. In Subsection 3.3, we show how to create the two LT-Random-OT protocols from a single LT-Random-OT protocol. Finally, we show an unfair LT-Random-OT protocol in Subsection 3.4 to prove Corollary 1.6.
Equivalence between LT-OT protocols and LT-Random-OT protocols with respect to bias
Having a protocol with inputs is an issue when building protocols loss-tolerantly. In recent LT-SCF protocols, if messages were lost for any reason, then the protocol is simply restarted at some point, but this is not always an option with OT because the inputs could have context, e.g., Alice's bits could be database entries. For this reason, we cannot simply "reset" them and repeat the protocol.
To remedy this issue, we use Random-OT. It is well known that OT and Random-OT share the same cheating probabilities, i.e., if there exists an OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A OT , B OT ) = (x, y) then there exists a Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A ROT , B ROT ) = (x, y), and vice versa. For completeness, we show these reductions and prove they preserve loss-tolerance.
Protocol 3.1 (LT-Random-OT from LT-OT).
(i) Alice randomly chooses x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1}.
(
ii) Alice and Bob input the choices of bits above into the LT-OT protocol so that Bob learns x b .
(iii) Alice outputs (x 0 , x 1 ) and Bob outputs (b, x b ).
It is straightforward to see that this reduction preserves the loss-tolerance of the LT-OT protocol since we are only restricting how the inputs are chosen. More interesting is the reduction from LT-Random-OT to LT-OT.
Protocol 3.2 (LT-OT from LT-Random-OT). (i) Alice and Bob decide on their desired choices of inputs to the LT-OT protocol.
(ii) Alice and Bob use an LT-Random-OT protocol to generate the output (x 0 , x 1 ) for Alice and (b, x b ) for Bob.
(iii) Bob tells Alice if his output bit b is equal to his desired index. If it is not equal, Bob changes it and
Alice switches her two bits. This reduction is a way to derandomize the outputs of the LT-Random-OT protocol. We see that this also preserves the loss-tolerance of the LT-Random-OT protocol since classical information can simply be resent if lost in transmission.
Using the reductions above, we have reduced the task of finding LT-OT protocols to finding LT-Random-OT protocols.
Creating LT-Random-OT protocols
There is a simple construction of an SCF protocol with bias ε ≈ 3/4 and it proceeds as follows. Alice and Bob first use a WCF protocol with bias ε ≈ 0. The "winner" gets to flip a coin to determine the outcome of the SCF protocol. Of course, a dishonest player would like to "win" the WCF protocol since then they have total control of the SCF outcome.
We mimic this idea to create a protocol prototype for LT-Random-OT and discuss why it does not work.
Protocol 3.3 (A protocol prototype).
(i) Alice randomly chooses two bits (x 0 , x 1 ) and Bob randomly chooses an index b ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) Alice and Bob perform an LT-WCF protocol with bias ε WCF to create random c ∈ {0, 1}. This protocol has bias ε ROT < 1/2 if ε WCF < 1/2. However, the problem is that honest Alice learns b with probability 3/4 when Bob is honest. This is simply not allowed in a Random-OT protocol because honest Alice should never obtain any information about b. Honest Bob learns x 0 ⊕ x 1 with probability 3/4, which is also not allowed since he should only learn x 0 or x 1 . This illustrates another issue when designing OT and Random-OT protocols.
To remedy this problem, instead of Alice and Bob revealing their bits entirely, they can use (possibly unfair) LT-Random-OT protocols. We present a modified version of the protocol below. 
(iv) Alice and Bob abort if and only if either LT-Random-OT protocol is aborted.
We now prove that this LT-Random-OT protocol has cheating probabilities equal to those in Theorem 1.5. We show it for cheating Alice as the case for cheating Bob is almost identical. Since x ≥ y, Alice would prefer the outcome of the WCF protocol to be c = 0. She can force c = 0 with probability A WCF and in this case she can learn b with probability x. If c = 1, she can learn b with probability y. Letting A ′ ROT be the amount she can learn b in the protocol above, we have
All that remains to prove Theorem 1.5 is to show that an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A ROT , B ROT ) = (α, β) implies the existence of an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A ROT , B ROT ) = (β, α), for any α, β ∈ [1/2, 1]. This way, we can just set x = max{α, β} and y = min{α, β}.
Symmetry in LT-Random-OT protocols
Suppose we have an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A ROT , B ROT ) = (α, β), for some α, β ∈ [1/2, 1]. We now show how to create an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A ROT , B ROT ) = (β, α). The trick is to switch the roles of Alice and Bob. (ii) Alice randomly chooses d ∈ {0, 1} and sends d ⊕ x b to Bob. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.5.
An unfair LT-Random-OT protocol
We present here an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A ROT , B ROT ) = (1/2, 1). Note that even though this protocol has bias ε ROT = 1/2, it can be used to create a protocol with smaller bias using recent LT-WCF protocols and Theorem 1.5. 
Each choice of (x 0 , x 1 ) corresponds to Bob having a different Bell state at the end of the protocol. From this, x 0 and x 1 can be perfectly inferred, yielding B ROT = 1.
Conclusions and open questions
We have designed a way to build LT-OT protocols by using an LT-WCF protocol to help balance the cheating probabilities in a (possibly unfair) LT-Random-OT protocol. This protocol uses well known reductions between OT and Random-OT and the reduction to switch the roles of Alice and Bob.
The construction in this paper is robust enough to design OT protocols with other definitions of cheating Bob. Suppose that Bob wishes to learn f (x 0 , x 1 ) where f = XOR is some functionality. In this case, we may not be able to switch the roles of Alice and Bob in a way that switches the cheating probabilities as in Subsection 3.3. However, instead of just using one LT-Random-OT protocol and creating another from it, we could have just as easily used two different LT-Random-OT protocols (with a consistent notion of cheating Bob).
A limitation of this protocol design is that is uses LT-Random-OT protocols as subroutines. Even if LT-WCF protocols with bias ε WCF ≈ 0 are constructed, using the protocols in Subsection 3.4 can reduce the bias to only ε OT ≈ 1/4. It would be interesting to see if there exists an LT-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (A OT , B OT ) = (α, β) where α + β < 3/2.
An open question is to show if using more LT-WCF subroutines can help improve the bias. In [CK09] , many WCF protocols were used to drive the bias of a SCF protocol down towards the optimal value of 1/ √ 2 − 1/2. Can something similar be done for OT or LT-OT?
